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NOTES AND COMMENTS

of deeds within six days after date said documents were excuted,
constructive notice shall date from the time of execution, otherwise
from the time of receipt as shown by the endorsement of the register
of deeds thereon.
5. The holder or owner of every mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention contract or other lien or encumbrance on
any vehicle registered in another state and filed or recorded in that
state shall within ninety days after such vehicle is removed to this
state file with the department of motor vehicles the original or a certified copy of such mortgage or other instrument. Every mortgage or
other such instrument not so filed shall be subject to any lien or
encumbrance against such vehicle thereafter filed with the department
according to this act, provided said vehicle shall have continuously
remained in this state for said period of ninety days. ,
6. This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the
date of its ratification, except that it shall not affect the validity of
any mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention contract, or other lien or encumbrance on a motor vehicle which was executed and registered according to law at the date of such ratification.
But all such mortgages and other instruments not filed with the department within a period of six months after said date of ratification shall be subject to liens and encumbrances thereafter filed against
such vehicle.
WALLACE C.

MURCHISON.

Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of CausesRemoval by an Automobile
A considerable contribution to legal animism is made by a recent
opinion of a Federal District Court sitting in South Carolina.' A
state statute2 provides that when a motor vehicle is operated in violation of law or negligently one thereby sustaining personal injuries or
property damage has a lien on the vehicle for his damages and may
attach it in the manner provided for other attachments.3 A native son
was killed in an automobile accident and his administrator brought
action in the State Court for $25,000 against the car's owner (who was
apparently also its driver) and, pursuant to South Carolina practice,
against the car itself. The owner was served -personally and the car
was attached. The car was licensed in Pennsylvania, of which state
"Weatherford v. Radcliffe et al., 63 F. Sunp: 107 (D.C.S.C. 1945). The
"al." is "one Sport Model four-door. Ford Automobile, 1944 Pennsylvania
License No. IFC76."
'Code of Laws of S. C. (1942) §8792.
a This statute has been in force, without amendment, since 1912.
to damages to "a buggy or wagon or other property."

It refers
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the individual defendant was a citizen. The individual defendant secured removal to Federal District Court. The Judge of that Court
remanded, the controlling factor being that the automobile had not
joined in the removal petition.
The result thus rests upon the concept of the motor vehicle as a
legal person. Once this hurdle is taken, the opinion lays down the
propositions: (1) that the individual defendant and the automobile were
joint tort feasors; (2) that there was thus no separable controversy ;4
and (3) that the rule applying in such cases is that all defendants must
join in the removal petition. 5
Considerable attention is devoted to the fact that the suit against the
car is an in ren; proceeding, the opinion pointing 9ut that libels in
admiralty and under forfeiture statutes are such proceedings with which
Federal courts are familiar. "In an in ren case the thing sued may be
represented and appear in court and defend and exercise all rights it
may have. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant automobile would have had a right to file a petition or join in a petition for
removal." 6 The creation of personality for the vehicle is then carried
to its logical conclusion: "I hold: 1. That there is diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and defendants .... 7
Wisely, the opinion makes no attempt to draw an analogy between
the automobile and a corporation. While concededly there are intellectual difficulties in clothing a corporation with citizenship for diversity
purposes, its normally recognized powers to sue and be sued, to own
property, to enter into contracts and to carry on business generally,
present a much stronger claim for the privilege than can be made for
the automobile. However, the Court's apparent reliance on an analogy
to admiralty and forfeiture cases furnishes even less support for the
result. No ship has yet been made a citizen of a State and when the
United States sues 75 tubs of butter it does not endow either the tubs
or the butter with citizenship. Obviously diversity jurisdiction is not
involved in such cases.8 To concede that an inanimate object may be
' That there is no separable controversy when it appears from the complaint
that defendants are joint tort feasors is the general rule in negligence cases.
HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACrICE (1931) §2377. The South Carolina Court has held
that when an individual and car are sued jointly, the individual can remove the
case against him to the county of his residence, leaving the case against the car
in the county of attachment. Ackerman v. One Mack Truck and Trailer, 191
S. C. 74, 3 S. E. (2d) 684 (1939); Mahon v. Burkett, 160 S. C. 48, 158 S. E.

141 (1931).
Despite discussion of jurisdiction in these opinions, the Federal
Court in the principal case correctly held that they actually dealt with venue,
not jurisdiction.
'This is the general rule. DOBIE,,HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1928) §93.

663 F. Supp. 107, 111.
63 F. Supp. 107, 112.
' Cf. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S.403, 25 L. ed. 206 (1878), approving removal, on diversity grounds, of a condemnation proceeding brought by a
corporation clothed by state statute with power of eminent domain. The diversity
found, of course, was between the plaintiff corporation and the property owner.
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treated for some purposes as a defendant in a law suit is one thing.
To say that it thus acquires citizenship is under some suspicion of being
a non sequitur.
When a result like this is reached, some search for an explanation
outside of the reasoning in the opinion is in order, but in this' case it
is none too fruitful.
One possibility is that the Judge was led astray by defendant's
counsel. The opinion indicates, without intimating the tactical reason,
that the individual defendant's counsel believed the case against the car
should remain in the State Court. 9 Thus apparently neither side was
attempting to have the entire case litigated in Federal Court (though
it also appears that the answer filed in Federal Court by the same counsel was a joint answer for the individual and the car). In this somewhat confused situation it is doubtful that tactics of counsel should be
seized upon to absolve the Court of so patent a departure from reality.
A second possibility is that the Judge was enforcing a policy of restricting diversity jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible. There
is some language which might be so construed.' ° However, if this
was the objective, a much more adequate solution would have been to
say flatly that the automobile, though a party, cannot be a citizen of a
state and hence there could be no removal.'1 Further, the opinion purports to confine itself to the specific facts; and it will not operate to
'Counsel may possible have had in mind some notion of getting two bites at
the cherry, while confining the opposition to one, by some non-mutual application
of res judicata. However, the joint answer in Federal Court seems inconsistent
with such a notion. The petition for removal alleged that there was a separable
controversy and counsel so argued in opposition to the motion to remand, relying
on the distinction between an action in personam against the individual and one
in- ren against the car. This, also, is inconsistent with the position that the
case against the car should remain in State Court, as ordinarily the entire case
is removed when a separable controirersy is found to exist.
"0"The Removal Statutes must be strictly construed and due regard for the

rightful independence of the state governments requires that federal courts

scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits of their statutory
authority." 63 F. Supp. 107, 111.
1L Prior to the April 20, 1940, amendment to 28 U. S. C. A. §41 citizens of
the District of Columbia could not qualify as citizens of a State for diversity

purposes. And in Ralya Market Co. v. Armour & Co., 102 F. 530 (C. C. Iowa

1900), it was held that a partnership, sued in the firm name under authority
of a state statute, was not a citizen and the case could not be removed, at least

in the absence of an application to the State Court by the individual partners
to be substituted for the firm as defendants. In McLaughlin v. Hallowell, 228
U. S. 278, 33 Sup. Ct. 465, 57 L. ed. 835 (1913), a similar result was reached
by the lower Federal Court and the State Court subsequently denied the adpplication of the partners to be substituted as defendants. Thus no removal was
ever permitted, but the U. S. Supreme Court did not pass on the merits of the
lower Federal Court's order of remand. The more usual result in partnership
cases is -to allow the citizenship of the partners to govern. Raphael v. Trask,
194 U. S. 272, 24 Sup. Ct. 647, 48 L. ed. 973 (1904) ; Great Southern Fire
Proof 'Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 499, 20 Sup. Ct. 690, 44 L. ed. 842 (1900).
Of course, refusing to allow removal because of non-citizenship of the automobile would still emphasize the legal entity of the vehicle as contrasted with the
citizenship of the owner.
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prevent removal in any case duplicating its facts, provided only that
the car joins in the petition. So, if this confinement of the reach of the
opinion is to be taken at face value, a desire to restrict diversity jurisdiction was not the motivating cause of the result. However, the
reasoning involved might operate to prohibit removal of cases with
different facts-for instance, when the car is registered in South Carolina. (This is just a suggestion, as the available data do not yet furnish
reliable criteria for determination of the citizenship of an automobile.)
Probably the most important factor in the decision is the simple
fact that the South Carolina practice sanctions naming the car as a
defendant. This apparently lead the Judge to overlook the obvious
analogy to actions in which, while only individuals are named as defendants, property is attached, either as a basis for jurisdiction or as
ancillary to personal service. 12 In fact, it is difficult to see why the
principal case is not controlled by the express language of 28 U. S.
C. A. §79: "When any suit shall be removed from a State court to a
district court of the United States, any attachment or sequestration of
the goods or estate of the defendant had in such suit in the State court
shall hold the goods or estate so attached or sequestered to answer the
final judgment or decree in the same manner as by law they would have
been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by
the court in which said suit was commenced." This statute is not cited
in the opinion.
On the facts of the instant case it seems reasonably clear that the
only true defendant is the individual, that the car is attached simply as
an aid to collection of damages or to encourage settlement, and that the
state practice of naming the car as a defendant should not entail consideration of its citizenship or its participation in the removal petition.
The obvious next question is how to treat a case in which the driver
and owner of the car are different people. Even there, if both are sued
for personal judgment, the owner being joined on a theory of imputed
negligence, or if the owner is sued on such an imputation without
joinder of the driver, attachment should not prevent consideration of
the removal question solely on the basis of the citizenship of and
requests made by the individual defendants or defendant.
If the non-driving owner is not named as a defendant,18 other questions are raised.' 4 It still seems reasonably clear that, as far as the
2 It has been held that when the State Court's jurisdiction is based on attachment, the case can be removed to Federal Court even though, had the case originated in Federal Court, jurisdiction could not have been predicted solely on the
attachment. Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup. Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906).
See also Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U. S. 299, 59 Sup. Ct. 877, 83
L. ed. 1303 (1939).
8 The South Carolina Court has held that the car may be sued without making
the owner, operator or other person a party defendant. Tolbert v. Buick Car,
142 S. C. 362, 140 S. E. 693 (1927)
",Where driver and car are joined, there is perhaps an argument that the
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action against the car is concerned, the governing citizenship should
be that of the owner, just as it would be in an ordinary attachment case
in which an individual defendant, though named as such, cannot be
personally served. 15 However, will shifting the inquiry from citizenship of the car to that of the owner: (1) influence the decision as to
existence of a separable controversy? (2) influence the finding as to
jurisdictional amount?
The principal case would still answer the first question by saying
that there is a joint tort. It is, therefore, necessary to go one step
further in depersonalizing the automobile. What is needed here is an
approach typified by the old gag about the sheep's legs. .Question: "If
you call a sheep's tail a leg, how many legs will it have?" Answer:"Four. You can't make a tail a leg by calling it one." That the car
is the instrument by which a tort is committed is obvious, but that it
can be a tort feasor, joint or several, for the purpose of determining
removability does not follow. (At least, it is assumed that we are
unlikely to arrive at a rule of law that an automobile is liable if, under
all the circumstances, it fails to conduct itself as would a reasonably
prudent automobile.)
What the South Carolina legislature has actually done is to provide
that a car owner whose car is driven negligently to plaintiff's damage
is liable to the plaintiff to the extent of his interest in the. car, regardless of whether he could be adjudged negligent or otherwise held responattachment is merely ancillary and the driver alone can remove. If it prevailed,
it would furnish a relatively simple rule, eliminating further questions as to
separable controversy and jurisdictional amount. However, since the property
attached would not be the property of the removing defendant, and the action
against it is in reality one to foreclose the rights of its owner, the attachment
seems hardly to be ancillary to the case against the driver. It is doubtful, indeed,
if it would be so held if the owner appears, either for himself or in the name
of the car, and objects to removal or his citizenship would, if controlling, prevent
removal. On the other hand, wherever personal judgment is sought against the
owner, the attachment -is probably properly regarded as ancillary to the case
against him, though the question may be of no practical importance in the absence
of other claimants to rights in the car.
The statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §79, quoted in the text, does not authorize removal
by driver alone, as it presupposes a proper basis for removal, and the question at
issue is whether such basis is present when the car owner can not or does not
join in the petition. Further, its reference to the property of the defendant
probably means property of the defendant requesting removal.
" If the owner does not appear in the case, it might be treated in the same
way as a case in which two defendants are named, but one is not served and does
not appear. The rule there is that if the defendant not served is a non-resident,
the other (also a nonresident) may remove alone; but if he is a resident, the other
may not remove in the absence of a separable controversy. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534, 59 Sup. Ct. 347, 83 L. ed. 334 (1939). That this rule might
apply even where the property of the defendant not served has been attached, is
indicated by Hunt v. Pearce, 284 F. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). 'However, even if
these cases apply generally in the situation under discussion, their rule could not
apply when the owner appears or is a co-citizen with plaintiff. An appearance
nominally made on behalf of the car should be treated, for this purpose, as an
appearance by the owner.
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sible under common law principles.
Plaintiff's rights against the
owner may still turn on his rights against the driver, since he has no
lien unless the car was being driven negligently or in violation of law.
But that dependence does not alone render the driver and owner joint
tort feasors or create a master-servant or principal-agent relation between them in the common law sense. The separable controversy decision should turn on these considerations rather than on the pat assump1
tion that driver and car are joint tort feasors. 7
As to the jurisdictional amount, the instant case holds that removal
can be had, if the car joins in the petition, regardless of the fact that
the car is not worth more than $500. "Both defendants have been
served and the amount of damages alleged is over the sum of $3,000,
and although one defendant can not respond in payment of a verdict
that may be obtained of more than $3,000, that does not alter the fact
that the amount sued for is the amount actually in controversy whatever may be the financial responsibility or the liability of the respective
defendants."us This, except for the word "liability," sounds like a
further personalization-an analogy to an insolvent individual. If that
is to be followed, it would apply equally well (and equally inappropriately) to the case of the non-driving owner. The opinion apparently
approves an unreported decision from the same District holding that
where the only individual sued was not served, and bond of $1,000
was substituted for the vehicle, the jurisdictional amount was not present. However, the opinion furnishes no clue to whether that rule
would also be applied to the case of the non-driving owner if the
defendant driver is personally served.
Again the only realistic approach is to look at the owner of the car.
He is obviously not in the situation of an insolvent defendant. The
only relief sought against him is the application of the value of the
car; and this is pretty clearly the "amount in controversy" as between
plaintiff and the owner. 19 The case should be decided in the same way
' The statute contains an exception for cases in which "the motor vehicle shall
have been stolen by the breaking of a building under a secure lock, or when the
vehicle is securely locked."
"7Though there are master and servant cases holding that a separable controversy is present when one defendant's liability is predicated on a statute and the
other's liability on the common law-see HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE (1931)
§2381-the rule announced by the Supreme Court seems to be that if State
decisions hold the defendants jointly liable there is no separable controversy,
regardless of this feature. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S.
184, 33 Sup. Ct. 250, 57 L. ed. 473 (1913); Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 217

U. S. 209, 30 Sup. Ct. 450, 54 L. ed. 732 (1910).
Cf. concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, supra note 15.
s63 F. Supp. 107. 111.
"°It has been held that when jurisdiction is based on attachment the amount
sued for controls, even though the value of the property attached is less than
the jurisdictional amount. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co.,
285 F. 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Gershowitz v. Lane Cotton Mills, 21 F. Supp.
579 (D. C. Tex. 1937) ; Randall v. Becton-Dickinson Co., 18 F. (2d) 631 (D. C.
Mass. 1927). However, at this point the analogy between the ordinary attach-
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as any other case in which there are several defendants and20 the relief
sought against one does not equal the jurisdictional amount.
It may be conceded that the approach herein suggested does not
automatically furnish clear answers to all the questions which may
arise, and even that some confusion could creep into cases resting on
such an approach. However, endowing the automobile with citizenship, the ability to commit a tort, and net worth will not eliminate the
confusion, but merely confound it.
Something might be made over the fact that, if this case continues
to be good law, there are multiple opportunities for enlarging its application. The statutory idea can be readily applied to the pistol with
which plaintiff is shot, the factory which omits noxious fumes, the
scaffold which collapses under the plaintiff, or any other property instrumental in the commission of a tort.2 1 Indeed, it might be possible to
allow the property to be named as a defendant in every attachment
22
suit and even in actions to foreclose mortgages or to quiet title.
Foreign corporations, not now barred from removal because their
stockholders are co-citizens with plaintiff, might be barred because their
real estate and manifold chattels are.23 And there would, perforce, be
a great blossoming of the law on the locus of citizenship of property.
It is pretty obvious that this is not going to happen; and, very probably,
as part of the history of its non-happening, the instant case will be
HENRY BRANDIS, JR.
repudiated.
ment case and the case of the non-driving owner breaks down. In the latter

the relief sought, when there is no imputed negligence alleged, can never exceed

the value of the car. In a rare case plaintiff might allege damages less than the
value of the car, and in such case the damages alleged should govern. A comparable situation is found in the lien cases holding that the amount of the claim,
not the value of the property, controls. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz,
262 U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 480,- 67 L. ed. 871 (1923); City of Pawhuska v. Midland Valley R. Co., 33 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A 8th, 1929).
20 The decision would, under the cases, turn on whether owner's and driver's
liabilities to plaintiff are "joint" or "several"-also stated as whether they have
a "common and undivided interest." McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415, 25 Sup.
Ct. 369, 49 L. ed. 533 (1905) ; Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370,
13 Sup. Ct. 348, 37 L. ed. 206 (1893) ; Stemmler v. McNeill, 102 F. 660 (C. C.
N. C. 1900). See also Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. ed.
1044 (1891). This question, therefore, involves something of the same considerations as are involved in determining whether there is a separable controversy.
If both decisions are controlled by -the same considerations, then: (1) If there
is a "joint" liability, there is no separable controversy, but jurisdictional amount
is present. Hence there would be no removal if the owner is a co-citizen with
plaintiff or does not join in the petition. (2) If there is "several" liability, there
is a separable controversy and the driver alone, if a nonresident, could remove.
2 Perhaps somewhere along the line there would be a due process limitation
on such absolute liability statutes.
2
" Due process would hardly be a bar here, since there is no question about
the validity of the underlying cause of action and the right to proceed by attachment is clearly recognized. There might be trouble if the statute could be said
to be intended primarily to defeat Federal jurisdiction. See Terral v. Burke
Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 4Z.Sup. Ct. 188, 66 L. ed. 352, 21 A. L. RL 186 (1922).
2" There are some, of course, who advocate restricting or eliminating the right
of foreign corporations to remove to Federal Court, but none has been found
who based his advocacy on the citizenship of the corporate property.

